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Abstract
In this study we use economic input-output analysis to calculate the inequality footprint of nations. An inequality footprint
shows the link that each country’s domestic economic activity has to income distribution elsewhere in the world. To this
end we use employment and household income accounts for 187 countries and an historical time series dating back to
1990. Our results show that in 2010, most developed countries had an inequality footprint that was higher than their within-
country inequality, meaning that in order to support domestic lifestyles, these countries source imports from more unequal
economies. Amongst exceptions are the United States and United Kingdom, which placed them on a par with many
developing countries. Russia has a high within-country inequality nevertheless it has the lowest inequality footprint in the
world, which is because of its trade connections with the Commonwealth of Independent States and Europe. Our findings
show that the commodities that are inequality-intensive, such as electronic components, chemicals, fertilizers, minerals, and
agricultural products often originate in developing countries characterized by high levels of inequality. Consumption of
these commodities may implicate within-country inequality in both developing and developed countries.
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Introduction
There is no doubt that inequality in income exists both within
countries and between countries. There also seems to be
agreement that in both cases it is rising [51,56]. The causes of
this inequality are attributed variously to: conflict, governance and
possession of natural resources [11], technological change [43];
jobs; transportation costs [31]; and globalisation [45,19].
The UN sees inequality as a social justice issue as well as a threat
to social, political and economic stability around the world
[52,55]. Recent studies also link inequality to environmental
problems, sustainability, crime, disease and overall well-being
which in turn is closely linked to life expectancy [21,28,56].
Attributing to inequality such dire global consequences as social,
political and economic instability has implications for global
action. Even though there are no simple solutions to what has been
an intractable problem throughout history, our recognition of
inequality and its consequences brings with it obligations.
Competition for the consumer dollar has driven demand for
ever-cheaper goods and services. Our demand sets in motion
supply chains that ripple around the world. From time to time
scandals erupt in the press, such as use of child labour in the
making of a specific product [8,16]. In such cases we take some
responsibility for our consumption and pressure global businesses
to improve their practice in third-world countries [5]. However, in
the case of inequality existing within a particular country the
relationship to exported goods is not so clear-cut. In consuming
goods from this country – any goods – are we implicated in the
inequality that exists in the exporting country? If yes, the simple
solution would be to pressure the country to change through
boycotting its goods just as we boycott firms for their use of child
labour. However without our demand there would be no
production and perhaps, as cited in the case of child labour, no
jobs for those desperately in need of work [5]. Importing from
unequitable countries could actually ameliorate the situation. In
this study we ask simply: do more egalitarian countries import
from less egalitarian ones? Dissecting the social impacts of a
marginal dollar of trade with a country suffering from inequality is
a difficult task. But regardless of whether trade between equal and
less equal countries leads to a net gain or loss of welfare,
understanding where inequality is occurring, who is benefiting
from it, and which countries have the most polarized trade,
provides information useful for understanding the dynamics of
inequality and trade.
This study introduces the novel concept of an ‘inequality
footprint’, which is defined as the Gini index of the workforce that
is directly and indirectly required to satisfy the consumption of a
given population. Thus, the inequality footprint extends beyond
the boundaries of a particular country and includes people
working in countries that produce goods and services bound for
international trade. In this work we undertake a quantitative
analysis of the inequality footprint of the world’s nations and
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portray these footprints using a number of intuitive measures. We
do not argue whether trade between more and less equal countries
is a social good or ill, but merely provide a robust, global, account
of inequality and trade upon which such further economic analysis
may be built.
In section 2 we provide a context for our work through an
overview of the inequality literature, discussing the issue from the
perspective of world bodies such as the UN and the IMF and
drawing on some of the within-country inequality literature.
Following that we provide our methodology and our data sources
in section 3. We present the results in section 4 and section 5
concludes.
Background
2.1 Inequality as a global issue
The first target of the first millennium development goal
(MDG1) is to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of
people whose income is less than $1 a day (http://www.un.org/
millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml accessed 01/10/12). Growing
inequality makes it harder to reach this goal. As Kofi Annan
observed in 2005: ‘‘we cannot advance the development agenda
without addressing the challenges of inequality within and between
countries’’ [52]. Over the past 20 years inequality has risen within
more countries than it has fallen [57]. In 2007 the UN News
Centre reported that the United Nations Assistant Secretary-
General for Economic Development, Jomo Kwame Sundaram,
was concerned about a significant and disturbing increase in
inequality within and between countries around the world, which
he attributed to a worldwide decline in the number of jobs (http://
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21526&Cr=globaliza
tion&Cr1#.UF9-vRiTbbs accessed 24/09/12). Even in countries
in Northern Europe that have the world’s lowest income
inequalities [26], such as Germany, Denmark and Sweden [43]
inequality grew in the 2000s probably because of increased income
disparity [13].
Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez [3] see increasing income disparity
as at least partly attributable to an unprecedented surge in top
wage incomes [44]. They attribute the evolution of the top one per
cent share of wealth in various countries to political changes (e.g.
Reagan in the US and Thatcher in the UK), wars, financial crises,
global factors and taxation. Whatever the reason the wealthiest 20
per cent now account for 86 per cent of all private consumption
and the poorest account for around one per cent [55]. Even in
China and Russia increases in income are invariably going to the
top one per cent of the population [3,12]. This matters because
inequality within countries affects people’s well-being [28,56]; it
breeds social resentment and generates political instability as
people feel that they are losing out while others are becoming rich
[43,10]. Such inequality would seem to be a recipe for disaster.
2.2 Within country inequality
In the past it was assumed that globalisation would raise the
income of almost all nations and help redress inequality [31].
However many studies have found no obvious relationship
between a country’s participation in globalisation and positive
changes in inequality within countries [13,26]. Although a study
conducted by the IMF (2009:35) shows inequality in Mexico fell
after the mid-1990s [19] other studies disagree. A 2008 study of
wage inequality in Mexico found increased access to export markets
led to growing wage inequality [58] with the need to produce better
products for export than for domestic markets within industries and
hence the need for upgrading of skills for some workers. Thus wage
disparity increased within manufacturing industries where smaller
less productive plants with less skilled labour supplied local markets
while larger more productive plants with highly skilled labour
produced goods for export. Other studies quoted by Pavcnik [45]
found a similar process in Argentina and Indonesia [12,52].
A related skill-based driver of wage inequality has been a
general increase in use of information and communication
technologies (ICT) by some industries, which has increased their
demand for high-skilled, college educated, workers [45,26]. Where
access to technology skills and education are available only to the
elite the poor have no ability to move from unskilled to higher
skilled occupations (e.g. from agriculture to industry) thus
increasing inequality. This selective apportioning of education is
not confined to developing countries. A 2005 UN study found
some of the highest income inequalities – as well as in Mexico and
Turkey – were in the USA [52] much of which in the US was
attributed to access to education, in particular skill-biased
technological change (SBTC) [17,6]. Coincidentally the life
expectancy of poorly educated women in the US has also slipped
in the last decade from a gap of 5.8 years to a gap of 8.6 years
compared with women with a Bachelor’s degree or higher [42].
Equal access to education, job creation and skill development
opportunities are consistently seen to be the most important factors
in the building of a more equitable society [43,45].
The issue around access to education and its effect on inequality
is not confined to the production of finished goods. Goldberg [18]
suggest that global trade in intermediate goods also has an effect
on wage inequality with some large firms from developed countries
locating unskilled parts of production in developing countries and
reserving any skilled part of production for developed countries
[45]. Apart from relieving firms of the need to develop skills in
workers in developing countries, this can also have the effect of
firms shifting responsibility for wages and working conditions away
from the regimes of developed countries where conditions are
generally governed by industrial law to countries where such laws
do not exist or else are only just emerging. In this case (i.e.
production of intermediate goods) and in the case of final products
the producer has some control over skill development, working
conditions and wages and can act to alleviate inequality if
motivated to do so.
At the other end of the supply chain consumers have some
control over the demand for imported goods. For example
consumers in Scandinavia live in some of the most equal of all
OECD countries [44] and amongst the most equal in the world
[26] yet they import goods from some of the most unequal. One
such is China where although foreign demand has increased
employment considerably [26] it has induced jobs mainly in low-
paid, low and medium-skilled areas without generating new job
opportunities for the growing number of college-educated workers
in the middle thus adding to inequality [38]. Another Scandina-
vian trading partner, the Russian Federation, also has high
inequality [50]. The economic recessions in Asia, Latin America
and the Russian Federation following the financial crises of the
1990s brought increased unemployment and inequality, both of
which contributed to the erosion of social cohesion. This was
especially true of Russia, where the Gini inequality index rose
from 0.397 in 2001 to 0.422 in 2009 [12] and which recorded one
of the lowest life satisfaction scores in the world just above
Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus [28]. Other Scandinavian trading
partners such as Brazil and the Philippines are experiencing
worsening inequality, which has been linked to trade liberalisation.
For example a 2005 UN study [50] found that trade liberalisation
caused wages to decline in Brazil and Mexico especially in the case
of unskilled workers. The study went on to also link trade
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liberalisation with widening inequality in the Philippines and
Eastern Europe.
2.3 Responsibility
The debate around the causes of within-country inequality, and
even within which countries it is rising or falling, is unresolved [4].
Also different methodologies for studying inequality can produce
different results [39] making it difficult to generalise causes and
specific effects. So who may be held responsible for improving the
situation? Blaming bad government in such countries [11] is to
oversimplify the issues. After all, global companies do business
with these countries. As Goldberg [18] point out, increasingly
global trade is about movement of goods between firms located in
different countries rather than the flow of goods between
countries, so perhaps such firms should take the blame for
supporting – and possibly exploiting – inequality. Blaming the final
consumer for demanding goods contaminated by the implication
that they arose from countries of gross inequality is also a
simplification. Consumers could also be seen as providing jobs for
the desperately poor. People need to work and often a poorly paid
job in a country of high wage disparity is better than no job. Firms,
governments and consumers all play a part in the complex web of
production, wages and work. With a better understanding of
within-country inequality all can play a part in bringing about a
more equal society.
The ‘inequality footprint’ can provide a tool to assist in tracking
the inequality implicated in goods as they move around the world.
The concept of ‘footprint’ is familiar from the literature. Studies
have been conducted, for example, on the emissions footprint
showing that consumption in one country can cause emissions in
another [59]. Or the water footprint that can track embodied
water in goods as they move around the world and can distinguish
‘scarce water’ inputs from non-scarce water inputs [22]. We also
know that consumption in one country requires the input of labour
from other countries [38], which may or may not be problematic
depending on work conditions and the age of workers. Just as
campaigns for fair and ethical work conditions that distinguish
unethical (e.g. child labour) from other labour we distinguish
problematic (unequal) labour from equal labour. We define an
inequality footprint as the Gini index of the workforce that is
directly and indirectly required to satisfy the consumption of a
given population. In this way we cast income inequality into the
same footprint accounting framework as scarce water, GHG
emissions and unethical work practices. These accounts may then
be used to study the correlative or causal relationship between
consumption and inequality.
Methodology and Data Sources
3.1 Data sources
This section describes the data foundation of this work. We use
three databases covering 187 countries:
1. Employment: the International Labour Organization’s LA-
BORSTA database [24], and the United Nations System of
National Account UNSNA-Official Country database [53];
2. Income and global inter-industry transactions data: the Eora
Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO) database [14,32,33];
3. Gini index: the Standardized World Income Inequality
Database (SWIID) version 3.1 [47], and the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED) database
(http://stats.oecd.org/) provide Gini indices referring to both
before-tax and after-tax income. In this paper we have used the
after-tax Gini index data. Also we including Gini index
database from the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/).
In essence, we use data on employment, income and Gini
indices to construct income distributions for the 187 countries in
our study (see Appendix S1 in File S1). These income distributions
are then cast into the shape of a so-called national satellite account
(see Appendix S3 in File S1) that accompanies global inter-
industry (MRIO) transactions data. In unison, the MRIO data and
income distribution satellite enable tracing economic activity in
one location to income distributions in other locations around the
world. This is explained in detail in the remainder of this section.
3.2 Basic input-output theory
This work is concerned with enumerating employment and
inequality footprints for the world’s economies. As in previous
studies on carbon footprints [20,46], water footprints [15], and
biodiversity footprints [34], we apply the method of economic
input-output (IO) analysis [36].
The centrepiece of any IO analysis is an assembly of three
matrices: one N6N intermediate transactions matrix T with
elements Tij that represent monetary amounts intermediate
demand from supplying economic sectors such as agriculture,
forestry, fishing, mining, manufacturing, utilities, trade, transport,
or services i= 1,…,N into using sectors j= 1,…,N; one K6N value
added matrix v with elements vkj that represent monetary amounts
of primary input from value-added categories i.e. wages and
salaries, gross operating surplus, and net taxes on production
k= 1,…,K into using sectors j= 1,…,N; and one N6M final
demand matrix y with elements yjm that represent monetary
amounts of final demand from supplying economic sectors
i= 1,…,N into final demand categories i.e. household consump-
tion, government final consumption, gross fixed capital expendi-
ture, and changes in inventories m= 1,…,M.
This assembly is a balanced financial account in a sense that
total uses x=T1N+y1M equal total supply x9= 1Kv+1NT, where
1N = {1,1,…,1} etc are suitable summation operators, and where
the prime (‘) symbol denotes transposition. Setting T1N =Ax, we
find the fundamental input-output identity x=Ax+y1M, where I is
a N6N identity matrix, A is the input coefficients matrix, and is
the famous Leontief inverse.
3.3 Extended input-output analysis
It was always Leontief’s intention to put IO analysis to use for
solving environmental and social problems [35,36]. To this end,
the input-output account assembly (T, v, y) is supplemented by a
16N environmental or social satellite account Q with elements Q1j
describing amounts of some environmental or social variable (for
example energy, emissions, employment) associated with (used by,
emitted by) economic sectors i= 1,…,N. Setting Q1N =qx, we
find environmental or social accounting identities as Q=Q1N =q,
where Q represents the economy-wide total of the satellite account
Q. The vector q holds so-called intensity coefficients (for example
energy intensities, employment intensities) that describe the
amount of the satellite variable associated with (used, emitted
per) one unit of total use. In contrast, the multiplier m describes
the amount of the satellite variable associated with one unit of final
demand. The multiplier m includes all direct and indirect flow-on
effects rippling throughout the complex supply-chain network of
the entire economy, as described by the Leontief inverse L, where
m=qL. The environmental and social accounting identities are
the basis of the widely used Leontief demand-pull model, which
interprets Q as the total environmental or social inputs required to
satisfy a final demand bundle y. Therefore, Q is also referred to as
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an environmental or social footprint (depending on the nature of
the satellite variable).
Whilst emissions satellite accounts are the basis of many carbon
footprint studies [20,46], the satellite accounts Q used in this work
are employment accounts E in units of full-time equivalent person-
years, and wage and salary income accounts W in units of US$.
These accounts were constructed at a detail of 187 countries (see
Appendix S1 in File S1) with a combined 15,909 sectors in order
to complement a matching Multi-Region Input-Output (MRIO)
framework (T, v, y) of the world economy [33,37,40,41]. Whilst
the income satellite account W is based on a multitude of data
sources [33], the employment satellite account E is based
predominantly on data published by the ILO [24]. Further details
on the construction procedures followed are given in Appendix S3
in File S1.
3.4 Inequality satellite accounts
The employment and income accounts E and W can be used to
determine employment and income footprints of nations [1,38]. In
order to construct satellite accounts on income inequality, data on
employment and income have to be collected, and assembled into
a separate satellite account, for a number of income classes. Such
detailed data are hard to come by for most countries as a whole,
for example the Household Expenditure Surveys of Brazil [23],
and Australia [2], let alone for a complete suite of world nations
and broken down into economic sectors as represented in the
MRIO database that we use. We have therefore devised a strategy
to estimate distributions of income across C income classes for
individual industry sectors in individual countries from three data
items: a) the country’s Gini index c, b) the sector’s total income
payments for employees Itot, and c) the sector’s total workforce
Ptot.
Income inequality is typically depicted in Lorenz curves (Fig. 1).
Cumulative income I(c) at income class c (normalised to 100%)
I(c)~
1
Itot
ðc
0
i(c)dc ð1Þ
is plotted against cumulative workforce (equally normalised).
P(c)~
1
Ptot
ðc
0
p(c)dc ð2Þ
In the case of perfect income equality, cumulative income
increases proportionally with cumulative workforce, and the
Lorenz curve is a diagonal connecting the origin with the point
{1,1} (dashed line). Any degree of income inequality will see
cumulative workforce increase more rapidly than cumulative
income, thus leading to a convex Lorenz curve (circle markers in
Fig. 1)
I(c)~f ½P(c) ð3Þ
This Lorenz curve can be approximated by a power function
(solid line in Fig. 1)
f~P(c)j ð4Þ
Total income equality corresponds to j~1, and j??
increasing inequality. A power function also ensures that all
Lorenz curve representations pass through the origin {0,0} and
the point {1,1}.
The Gini inequality index c can be calculated as the ratio of the
area between the diagonal and the Lorenz curve, and the area
below the diagonal:
c~
1=2{
Ðc
0
I(c)
1=2
~1{2
ðc
0
I(c)~1{2
ðc
0
P(c)j~1{
2
jz1
P(c)jz1Dc0 ð5Þ
Since P(0) = 0 and P(C) = 1 according to the definition in Eq.
2, we can evaluate the integral, and find the relationship between j
and c as
c~1{
2
jz1
uj~
1zc
1{c
ð6Þ
Fig. 1 shows an example for an approximation of a Brazilian
Lorenz curve with j= 2.51 (solid line), based on data (circles)
yielding c = 0.43. We have added evidence in support of the
power function approximation in Fig. S1.
Figure 1. Lorenz Curve for Brazil’s Income Distribution in 2009.
Notes: Circles: data from IBGE [23]; solid line and regression equation:
power function approximation from Eq. 3; dashed diagonal line: Lorenz
curve for complete income equality. Further examples about the quality
of the power function fit can be found in Fig. S1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110881.g001
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 leads to
Inserting Eq. 6 into Eq. 3, we find the income distribution
p cð Þ
Ptot
~
d
dc
P cð Þ½ ~ d
dc
I cð Þ
1=j
 
~
d
dc
1
Itot
ðc
0
i cð Þdc
1{c
1zc
2
4
3
5
~I
{
1{c
1zc
tot
1{c
1zc
ð
i cð Þdc
 {1{c
1zc
{1
i cð Þ~I{
1{c
1zc
tot
1{c
1zc
ðc
0
i cð Þdc
0
@
1
A{
2c
1zc
i cð Þ
ð7Þ
Eq. 7 can be evaluated by choosing income intervals i(c), and
calculating corresponding workforce fractions. Choosing a large
number C of intervals will increase the resolution of the
approximation. Fig. 2 shows an example for an approximation
of a Brazilian Lorenz income distribution curve, based on data
(circles) yielding c= 0.43.
The average wage w(c) for each income class c can be
determined via
w cð Þ~i cð Þ=p cð Þ ð8Þ
Assuming that an income class satellite would identify L « C
classes according to wage intervals wl,w(c) #wl+1, and assuming
that one satellite class l M {1,…,L} contains nl such wage classes
{c1,…,nl}, the income class satellite account Q simply reads
Q(l)~
X c with
wlvw(c)ƒwlz1
i(c)~
Xnl
n~1
i(cn) ð9Þ
The workforce in each satellite class l is then taken from Eq. 7 as
R(l)~
X c with
wlvw(c)ƒwlz1
p(c)~
Xnl
n~1
p(cn) ð10Þ
The average wage in each satellite class l is
w(l)~Q(l)=R(l), ð11Þ
with wlvw(l)ƒwlz1. Repeated for all sectors in the MRIO
database, this procedure will yield two satellite accounts Q and R
sized C6N, one for employment by class, and one for income by
class.
3.5 Inequality footprints
Inequality footprints of nations can now be calculated subjecting
the income and employment class accounts to the Leontief-type
demand-pull terms of income inequality would then proceed as
follows. Assume a N61 vector y X
bundle originating from country X, the inequality footprint of
which is to be evaluated. The impact of y X
earned in economic sectors j in various classes c is h= {hxQ}
= q(I-A){1yX , where q~Qbx{1
class per unit of total use, and where bx is a diagonal matrix holding
total use. The impact of yin terms of employment in various
classes is r~frcjg~r(I-A){1yX , where r~Rbx{1
ment by sector and by class per unit of total use. In other words, h
and r are the income and the workforce, respectively, broken
down by economic sector and by class, that are required directly
and indirectly to satisfy the final demand bundle yX , or in other
words the income and employment footprints of the final demand
bundle yX . The average wage w paid to this workforce in sector j
is w~
P
c hcj=
P
c rcj .
The Gini index c characterising this global workforce is
cX~
P
cj
hcj
P
cj
rcj
2
{
P
cj hcjrcjP
cj
hcj
P
cj
rcj
2
ð12Þ
cX includes people working in country X and in other countries
(cX refers to the inequality within the entire world, and therefore
relates to the between-country perspective of inequality described
by the ‘World Inequality’ concept in Milanovic [39]. In general
the more unequal the combination of import origins, the higher
the global inequality footprint. This perspective is equivalent to
Milanovic [39] also offers a method for decomposing global
inequality into within-country, between-country, and overlapping
effects). It is possible to isolate the inequality effect of the domestic
final demand bundle yX on particular countries d by only
considering the income and workforce needed from the sectors j
[d belonging to those countries d:
cdX~
P
c,j[d hcj
P
c,j[d rcj
2
{
P
c,j[d hcjrcjP
c,j[d hcj
P
c,j[d rcj
2
ð13Þ
The inequality footprint of a nation can be defined as a weighted
sum over countries of production origin
cmX~
P
c,j=[X hcj
P
c,j=[X rcj
2
{
P
c,j=[X hcjrcjP
c,j=[X hcj
P
c,j=[X rcj
2
ð14Þ
Figure 2. Income Distribution for Brazil in 2009. Notes: Circles:
data from IBGE [23]; solid line: power function approximation from Eq. 7.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110881.g002
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 describing a final demand
 in terms of income
 holds income by sector and by
 holds employ-
The inequality footprint of imports can be defined as a weighted
sum over countries of imports origin
cX~
X
d
wdX cdX=
X
d
wdX ð15Þ
The origin country weights w dX
footprints hdX or employment footprints rdX , or to the product
hdXrdX
the more unequal the selection of import origins, the higher the
inequality footprint of imports.
3.6 Qualifications
To our knowledge this is the first time that an income inequality
indicator (through the Gini index measure) has been combined
with an input-output calculus. Nevertheless, the implementation of
the method we have so far described has a number of
shortcomings.
First, as we described above, income distributions are largely
unavailable for most countries, and therefore we needed to
construct income distributions from Gini indices by fitting power
functions. These power function fits will necessarily deviate from
‘‘true’’ income distributions, but as we have shown in the example
for Brazil, and in more examples listed in Fig. S1, such deviations
are likely to be small.
Second, Gini indices are not available as continuous time series
for all countries. In the absence of continuous information, we
interpolated the Gini indices for missing years on the basis of those
for neighbouring years. We treat missing values at the beginning
and the end of our period of analysis by setting them equal to the
data available for the closest year. Large gaps exist only for
countries with a combined small fraction of GDP, and associated
errors are probably small. For Gini index availability see Appendix
S2 in File S1.
Third, data for Gini indices, income distributions, or Lorenz
curves are almost impossible to locate for individual industry
sectors, therefore we needed to assume that the national Gini
index applies to all sectors of the economy. This procedure will
lead to allocation errors in cases where inequality varies
significantly between sectors, and where a country predominantly
exports those products made by sectors with significantly above- or
below-average inequality (for example, soybean in Brazil as
opposed to other sectors such as petroleum oils).
Results
We find that the inequality footprint of countries differs
substantially from their within-country inequality (Gini index)
(Fig. 3). Countries occupy top ranks in Fig. 3 if their inequality
footprint is significantly larger than their within-country inequal-
ity. This can be either because their imports come from unequal
countries (for example Japan which imports from China, Thai-
land, Russia, etc see Table 1), or their own country’s society is very
equal (for example Sweden which occupies a rank similar to that of
Japan but for different reasons see Table S6 in File S1). The
opposite pattern holds for the bottom-ranked countries. Their
inequality footprint is significantly smaller than their within-
country Gini index. That means either their imports come from
equal countries (for example in the case of Russia), or their own
country’s society is very unequal (for example in the case of South
Africa) (see Table S6 in File S1). In addition to top- and bottom-
ranked countries we include France, Korea, United Kingdom,
United States, Thailand, and China because of their significant
share of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (for more
information about rankings see Table S5 in File S1).
Scandinavian countries have the largest disparity between their
inequality footprint and their within-country inequality (Fig. 3 and
Table S6 in File S1). Further investigation of the commodities that
are being traded reveals that inequality is often hidden from the
final consumer because of complex supply chains that stretch
across multiple countries and producers. The supply chains ending
in electronic goods often originate in export-oriented industries in
developing countries producing inputs such as electronic compo-
nents, chemicals, fertilizers, minerals, and agricultural commod-
ities characterised by high levels of inequality (Table 1). For
example, the consumption of a mobile phone in Norway may
require labour from China and Thailand to assemble phone
components, which in turn requires electronic circuit manufac-
turing in the Philippines and Malaysia, which in turn relies on
Russian petroleum oils. Despite the origins of Scandinavian
imports often being unequal societies that does not mean the
consumption in Norway, for example causes inequality in another
country. It could even be that the consumption decreases
inequality. We may simply say that through their consumption
Norwegians are implicated in or associated with the situation of
unequal income distributions (compare Section 2.3). Although
Norwegian society itself maintains high levels of equality through
active pursuit of re-distributive tax, unemployment and social
benefits policies, employment protection legislation for workers,
and reduced taxes on labour for low-income workers [44].
Many developed countries have an inequality footprint that is
higher than their within-country inequality largely because of their
imports from more unequal developing or transition economies.
Notable exceptions are the United States and the United Kingdom
(Fig. 3). These exceptions are due to their own country’s society
being unequal (see Table S6 in File S1). Whilst their inequality
footprint is not much different from that of Switzerland or the
Netherlands, their own Gini indices of 0.33 and 0.36 are
considerably above those of most European countries (Gini index
,0.30). Seventy million full-time equivalent workers from outside
the USA support the lifestyle of US citizens (this is equivalent to
50% of the total workforce in the USA for 2010), approximately
40 million of them are from countries with high inequality (see
examples in Table 1). The main imports of developed countries
(for example US) are electronics and clothes, raw materials and
natural resources, and manufactured parts that are used as an
intermediate input into making other products (Table 1). Exam-
ples for the latter category are: motor vehicle parts from Mexico
(where about 5 million laborers are working for US) exported for
input into car production in the US; electronics from China (about
27 million working for US); electronic integrated circuits from the
Philippines (about 2 million working for US) which are also used as
an input into electronic production in the US. Despite the high
amount of labour embodied in imports from unequal countries
and a large inequality footprint, the within-country Gini index of
the United States is higher than its total inequality footprint. Some
economists attribute [9] the rising income inequality in the US to
the large gap in wages between college-educated and high school
workers. Another factor affecting increasing inequality in the US is
the large disparity in income distribution between skilled and
unskilled workers and the low level of income redistribution.
Further, the opening up of trade in the United States could affect
inequality, for example through the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada, and
Mexico in 1994. This treaty increased income inequality in the US
because the unemployment rate increased when unskilled jobs
moved from the United States (high-wage) to Mexico (low-wage).
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 could be set to the income
 of both (compare with Part A in Eq. 1 in [39]). In general
The rise in within-country inequality in the United States is
coupled with a rise in the inequality footprint in the past two
decades (see Fig. S2). Fig. S2 shows a small decrease in inequality
after 2003 with an increase following the financial crisis and a
slight decrease again in the years during Barack Obama’s
presidency. This is perhaps because his election campaign
included amending the NAFTA and its outsourcing of jobs to
other countries.
Also in the United Kingdom within-country inequality is higher
than its total inequality footprint. Our results show that the
inequality footprint increased after the Tony Blair era with a
decrease in 2003 and then increased again after the global
financial crisis and recession in the United Kingdom after 2008
(see Fig. S2). The increasing inequality footprint after the recession
may be due to rising commodity prices in the United Kingdom
after 2008 [48]. Other researchers [54] attribute this rising
inequality to a decline in the progressivity of the personal income
tax schedule of the overall tax system in the United Kingdom and
the United States and others [27] attribute the increase in within-
country inequality in the United Kingdom and United States to
the Reagan–Thatcher era which gave the green light to financial
deregulation and dependence on foreign labour (labour embodied)
through trading activities.
Russia occupies an unusual position at the bottom of the rank,
because both its inequality footprint and its own Gini index are
lower than those of similarly ranked countries such as Brazil and
South Africa (see Table S6 in File S1). This is because
approximately 62% of Russia’s total share of embodied labour
arrives from the Commonwealth of Independent States where
inequality is low (Table 1). Most of its imported commodities are
from agriculture or are raw materials (Table 1). Fig. S2 shows that
the inequality footprint and within-country inequality increased in
Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The increase in the
inequality footprint occurred because either within-Ukraine
inequality increased in the 1990s (our findings showed that the
highest labour embodied in the past two decades was from
Ukraine (about 24% in 2010) [47] or Russia’s other trading
partners were from unequal countries. Also, the figure shows a
decrease in the inequality footprint in 2000s, which is either
because of the decreasing within-Ukraine inequality [47] in the
2000s or the economic crisis at the end of the 1990s in Russia.
Russia’s low inequality footprint is reflected in its recent history.
After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, tight economic links
amongst the newly independent republics and the former Eastern
Bloc continued [49]. Most of Russia’s current trade partners
achieved or maintained low inequality, either by keeping parts of
the Soviet-style social systems such as pension benefits, and by
avoiding economic reforms such as privatization [25], or, like
Lithuania, Eastern Germany and Poland, by joining the European
Union. On the other hand, Russia experienced a significant
increase in within-country inequality due to the privatization of
state-owned enterprises and inequality in wages within the private
sector between men, women, and older workers [7]. However,
because of the equality of its trading partners its inequality
footprint remains low.
Investigating the main imported commodities between devel-
oping countries (Table 1) shows that, for example, China and
Thailand import chiefly raw materials and intermediate goods.
China imports raw materials such as natural rubber from
Thailand and Malaysia, iron ore from Russia and Brazil, and
wood in rough from Madagascar and intermediate products
(electronic integrated circuits from the Philippines and Malaysia).
Thailand also imports raw materials (or natural resources) from
Russia (petroleum oil) and intermediate goods from Philippines
and Malaysia (electronic integrated circuits). By recognizing the
flows of embodied labour (or employment footprint) and the
commodities traded between developing (or maybe developed)
countries we provide information that can be used to support a
policy agenda to address inequality within those countries (more
details in conclusion).
Figure 3. The World’s Top and Bottom Countries in Terms of the Disparity between their Inequality Footprint and Within-Country
Inequality. Notes: The horizontal axis depicts the departure from 1 of the ratio between inequality footprint and within-country Gini index.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110881.g003
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The remaining countries with an inequality footprint higher
than their own Gini include Brazil and South Africa, which are
both characterised by high levels of inequality, probably because
both lack policies to provide a comprehensive social security net,
and both have experienced a rise in the wages gap between skilled
and unskilled labour in rural and urban regions [30,60]. In Brazil,
the main agricultural products that may be implicated in within-
country inequality are soya bean and fruit juices. Labour
embodied in these commodities is exported to the Netherlands,
Norway, and Austria, thus increasing the inequality footprints of
those countries. Ores and wood pulp from Brazil also play a large
part in increasing inequality footprints of importing countries
(Table 1). In South Africa, inequality has historical roots going
back to the beginning of the last century and apartheid when 10%
of the population (i.e. white) held 50% of the total share of income
[60] while the other racial groups (coloured 8%, Indian/Asian
Table 1. This Table Ranked List of Countries as in Fig. 3 but with Detail on Inequality-Implicated Commodities and the Labour
Embodied in Imports from Countries that have a Gini Index above 0.4.
Country
% Above
0.40
Inequality-implicated commodities (country embodied labour (‘000 FTE)
implicated-commodity)
% 0.35–
0.4
% 0.3–
0.35
% Less
0.3
Norway 34 CHN 128 mob; RUS 82 po; THA 75 tel; PHL 40 ec; BRA 38 sb; MDG 20 va 16 27 23
Slovenia 33 RUS 43 ng; CHN 26 mob; THA 13 ac 13 31 23
Hungary 38 RUS 157 po, gas; CHN 70 mob; THA 27 ec 10 23 28
Finland 43 RUS 195 po; CHN 86 pt, mob; THA 45 tra 13 20 24
Netherlands 36 CHN 2,150 mob; RUS 252 po; THA 202 mob; BRA 182 sb; PHL 175 ec; MDG 78 ff; UGA 70 tr 20 25 19
Sweden 29 RUS 145 po; CHN 135 mob; THA 80 mob; PHL 45 ec 16 24 31
Iceland 39 RUS 11 po; THA 9 dum; CHN 8.8 com 18 22 20
Japan 51 CHN 21,500 mob; THA 2,360 med; RUS 2,134 po; PHL 2,057 ec; MDG 1,161 va; MYS 728
ch; BRA 500 cop; LKA 418 sf
23 19 6
Switzerland 55 RUS 3,000 po, jew; PHL 668 ec; CHN 407 com; THA 379 cw; LKA 323 jew; ECU 266 coc, ros;
UGA 245 tob; MDG 145 coc
15 15 15
Austria 30 CHN 155 mob; RUS 139 po; THA 73 wd; MDG 69 ff, va; PHL 50 ec; BRA 39 ff 15 23 32
Denmark 32 CHN 125 com; RUS 101 po; THA 70 mt 16 26 27
Canada 39 CHN 3,251 mob; PHL 295 tx; MEX 275 gen; RUS 174 po; THA 180 mob; MDG 144 va; BRA
147 med, tra
35 16 9
Germany 43 CHN 8,490 mob, clo; RUS 3,184 po; MDG 683 va; BRA 605 pu; PHL 575 ec, sc; THA 591
jew, mob
15 25 17
Australia 42 CHN 4,884 com, med; THA 488 med, mob; MYS 313 scr; PHL 364 ec; PNG 120 po; RUS
122 po; BRA 108 io
23 27 9
France 38 CHN 4,894 com, pm; MDG 1,173 ff, va; RUS 776 po; MAR 608 clo, veg; BRA 366 pu;
THA 360 ac
20 27 15
Republic of Korea 41 CHN 974 mob, pm, clo; PHL 381 ec, ff; THA 377 tel; RUS 298 po, coal; MYS 155 ec 25 20 14
United Kingdom 38 CHN 7,284 mob, tel; RUS 896 po; THA 879 ec; PHL 820 ec; MYS 237 tel 20 23 20
United States 55 CHN 27,178 tra, rubb, med,clo; MEX 4,853 mot, cof; PHL 2,010 ec; RUS 1,428 po, jew;
BRA 1,345 tra, tob; THA 1,368 tel, jew; MDG
896 va
10 17 18
Thailand 27 CHN 261 com, mob; PHL 130 ec, tra; RUS 95 po, pu; MYS 105 ec; 40 19 13
China 32 THA 1,129 rubb, mob; RUS 1,040 wd, io; MDG 720 wd; PHL 741 ec; MYS 463 wd, rubb,
ec; BRA 313 io, po;
25 26 18
Philippines 30 THA 149 rc; CHN 69 pg; RUS 34 io, po; MYS 23 ec, ec 31 26 13
Mexico 41 CHN 281 com; RUS 172 po; BRA 157 tra; THA 98 pt; GTM 83 sug; PHL 78 ec; CHL 77 ff; MDG
75 nb; MYS 41 ec
34 16 10
Malaysia 38 THA 638 rubb, mob; CHN 289 ec; PHL 227 ec; RUS 101 io, po; MDG 49 clov 29 24 9
Brazil 52 RUS 585 po; CHN 413 tel; ARG 362 mot; BOL 349 pg; THA 178 med, tra; PRY 163 ma; PHL
166 ec; MEX 111 ref; VEN 101 po, coke
18 17 13
Russia Federation 12 UKR 2,293 rw,io; BLR 1,180 n.e.s.; TJK 595 cot, ff; KAZ 530 io; AZE 309 ff; LTU 52 dp,ff 18 20 50
South Africa 44 CHN 129 com, mob; ZMB 126 cot, cop; THA 72 rc; RUS 55 cop; BRA 38 mv; MDG 36 clov 20 20 16
Notes: The inequality footprint is broken down into contributions from trade partners with a Gini index of above 0.4, 0.35–0.4, 0.3–0.35, and less 0.3. ARG Argentina, AZE
Azerbaijan, BLR Belarus, BOL Bolivia, BRA Brazil, CHL Chile, CHN China, ECU Ecuador, KAZ Kazakhstan, LKA Sri Lanka, LTU Lithuania, MDG Madagascar, MEX Mexico, MYS
Malaysia, PHL Philippines, PRY Paraguay, RUS Russia, THA Thailand, TJK Tajikistan, UGA Uganda, UKR Ukraine, VEN Venezuela, ZMB Zambia, ac air conditioner, ch wood
charcoal, clo clothes, clov cloves, coc cocoa, cof coffee, cop copper, cot cotton, cw clocks and watches parts, dp dairy products, dum dumpers, ec electronic circuits, ff
fresh fruits and juices, gen electric generators, io iron ores, jew jewellery, ma maize, med medical articles and instruments, mob mobile, mot electric motors and it’s
parts, mt canning meat, n.e.s. not elsewhere specified, nb niobium ore, ng natural gas, pg petroleum gas, pm printing machine, po petroleum oil, pt part of telephone,
pu chemical wood pulp, rc milling rice, ref refrigerators, ros roses, rubb natural rubber, rw railway parts, sb soya bean, sc solar cell, scr monitors and projectors, sf
seafood, sug cane or beet sugar, tel telephone, tob tobacco, tr live tree, tra tractors parts and accessories, tx textiles, va vanilla, veg vegetables, wd wood in rough.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110881.t001
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2%, and African 80%) held 10%, 32%, and 8% respectively.
During the last two decades inequality has declined between racial
groups through the inclusion of blacks in the mining industry,
which has allowed African workers to be classified as employees
[29]. However inequality has risen within racial groups especially
within African groups because of the large number of uneducated,
unskilled workers and the small number of more highly paid
educated workers [29]. Despite its geographical location sur-
rounded by highly unequal countries, such as Namibia, Botswana
and Madagascar, the inequality footprint of South Africa is equal
to the footprint of some developed countries (Table 1). This is
probably because embodied labour imported from countries that
have a within-country Gini index above 0.4 is less than from
countries that have a within-country Gini index below 0.4
(Table 1).
Our results show that the highest inequality footprint in the
world is that of Namibia (0.5), because approximately 81% of total
labour embodied in imports is from countries that have high levels
of inequality (for example South Africa 65%, Russia 6%, and
China 3%). However Fig. 3 does not show Namibia in the bottom-
ranking countries because its own inequality is also the highest in
the world (about 0.64 according to the World Bank). Therefore
there is little difference between its within-country inequality and
its inequality footprint.
The inequality footprint can add to our understanding of
within-country inequality tracking implicated-commodities mov-
ing around the world. It also facilitates the distinguishing of
problematic unequal labour from equal labour worldwide just as
we already distinguish ‘scarce water’ from ‘non-scarce water’ [22]
and ethical labour from unethical labour such as child labour [5].
Our work provides another tool that can assist businesses,
government and non-government organizations to identify areas
of responsibility and take action to make the world a better place.
Conclusions
Both developing countries (producers) and developed countries
(consumers) may suffer from inequality because of trade activities.
Our findings show that the major commodities associated with
wage inequality during production are agricultural and electronic
commodities. Most developing countries who deal in these
commodities have an inequality footprint less than their within-
country Gini index. Among developed countries only the United
States and the United Kingdom have within-country inequality
higher than their inequality footprint. The United States shows an
increasing inequality footprint during the Clinton era and
especially after the NAFTA treaty came into force and then
decreasing inequality footprints after 2003 and increasing again
after the financial crisis of 2007 and slightly decreasing during
Barack Obama’s presidency. The United Kingdom shows that the
inequality footprint increased after the Tony Blair era with a
decrease in 2003 and then increasing again after the global
financial crisis and recession in the United Kingdom after 2008.
Both the United States and the United Kingdom showed a
decrease in their inequality footprint after 2003 and this may be
related to the war in Iraq and their relationships to Russia and
China. Russia has demonstrated one of the lowest inequality
footprints in the Commonwealth of Independent States and in the
world.
We began this paper with a reference to the first 1990–2015
Millennium Development Goal; we end with a comment on the
post-2015 agenda. The UN’s Task Team on the post-2015 UN
development agenda convened to address the issue of inequalities
concludes that inequalities must be addressed along with human
rights, peace, security and sustainability as a cornerstone of the
society that we want to live in and pass on to the next generation
[56].
Any new policy must be designed from a global perspective to
reduce inequality. The UN Systems Task Team on the Post-2015
UN Development Agenda [56] recommends that there be a
specific post-2015 goal on inequality with accompanying targets
and equity-weighting indicators including income distribution.
This they acknowledge will require investment in data collection,
analysis and use, requiring a flexible standard measurement to
capture, track and reflect inequalities and provide for transparency
and accountability in progress. The Task Team further linked
inequality to sustainability as a cornerstone of this agenda. It is
difficult for individual countries to take action on what is a global
problem. One way to address this, suggested by Basu [4], would be
to create a global body to coordinate inter-country anti-poverty
and anti-inequality policies, operating in the same way as the
WTO helps mitigate problems in trade and the UNEP in
environmental problems [4]. This is where the inequality footprint
can play a role. It provides a map of the movement of embodied
labour across countries and detailed information about which
commodities are the most labour-intensive and may be implicated
in within-country inequality.
The inequality footprint can add to our understanding of
within-country inequality tracking implicated-commodities mov-
ing around the world. It also facilitates the distinguishing of
problematic unequal labour from equal labour worldwide just as
we already distinguish ‘scarce water’ from ‘non-scarce water’ [22]
and ethical labour from unethical labour such as child labour [5].
Our work provides another tool that can assist businesses,
government and non-government organizations to identify areas
of responsibility and take action to make the world a better place.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Some examples of Lorenz curves calculated from
income and employment quintiles or deciles to determine the Gini
index of nations (circles represent the data [1,2,8,9,12] and the
lines represent the power function approximation we used (these
data populate I and P in section 3.4)).
(TIF)
Figure S2 Example of time series of within-country Gini index
(populate c in section 3.4) against inequality footprint (populate
cX
countries of Fig. 3 and including United Kingdom and United
States (each year is represented by a dot point and 2010 is
represented by the arrowhead).
(TIF)
Figure S3 Example of time series of within-country Gini index
(populate c in section 3.4) against inequality footprint (populate cX
in section 3.5) spanning 1990–2010 for some of the Latin America
countries (1990 is represented by the first point and 2010 is
represented by the arrowhead).
(TIF)
Figure S4 Example of time series of within-country Gini index
(populate c in section 3.4) against inequality footprint (populate cX
in section 3.5) spanning 1990–2010 for some of the European
countries (1990 is represented by the first point and 2010 is
represented by the arrowhead).
(TIF)
File S1 Various supporting text and tables.
(DOCX)
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 in section 3.5) spanning 1990–2010 for the top and bottom two
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